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Abstract 
Perhaps the most unique feature of ethnographic fieldwork is the distinctive form of 
relationality it entails, where the ethnographer’s identity as a researcher is not fixed in the 
way typical of most other forms of research. In this paper, I explore how this ‘undesigned 
relationality’ is understood, both in procedural ethics frameworks and by the different 
disciplines that have come to claim a stake in the ‘method’ itself. Demonstrating that the 
ethical issues it entails are primarily conceptualized via the lens of the ‘dual role’, I use 
this as a means of exploring the ideal relationship between researcher and subject that 
procedural ethics frameworks are premised upon. I go on to explore the epistemological 
differences in ways that ethnographers themselves understand and respond to the 
multiple forms of relationality that characterize fieldwork and the challenge this poses to 
the possibility of a pan-disciplinary consensus on ethnographic research ethics. 
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‘Whatever else ethnography is, it is about building, negotiating, losing, 
and celebrating relationships with fellow human beings’ ~ James S. 
Bielo (2015) 
 
‘In this approach [ethnography], there is a profound acknowledgement of the 
relationality of the human subject. Furthermore, to talk of the “field” is to talk of 
an entity which is itself relational and not merely spatial’ ~ Bob Simpson (2011) 
 
‘Ethnographic knowledge is always relational, the product of multiple cross-




For the past 14 years I have held various academic and administrative appointments on 
research ethics committees in Australia, Canada, and, most recently, the UK. For this 
reason, I am occasionally asked for advice on how to deal with issues raised during the 
ethics review process. In 2014, while at a Canadian university, I received one such query 
from a colleague, who forwarded me part of an email she had received from a doctoral 
student doing an ethnographic research project. I wasn’t privy to the particulars of the 
study beyond the core question the student posed, which was as follows: 
I have an ethics question for you. I knew the family that ended up agreeing to participate 
in my ethnography long before the start of the research (I never asked them directly to 
participate; they contacted me after receiving the recruitment materials I’d sent them to 
kindly send along to potentially interested others.) Because of my pre-existing friendship 
with the mother, however, I am part of her Facebook world. As such, I have access (as 
her friend, not as a researcher) to her Facebook posts. My question for you is: As a 
researcher, do I have to pretend that I don't see her Facebook world? In other words, 
when I'm talking to her about the research or asking her questions in interviews, can I 
refer to things she’s posted? 
 
Unsure of how to respond, in her email to me my colleague asked: ‘Is this just a 
case of having a conversation with the participant and asking them if they are 
comfortable with her using their Facebook information, getting consent etc., or should 
she be pretending that she doesn’t see the Facebook account or terminating her Facebook 
friendship during the research?’ Clearly, the core ethical issue being raised in the 
correspondence was the researcher’s pre-existing relationship with the study participant: 
the researcher’s participant was simultaneously a friend, and she had access to this woman’s 
life beyond the formal parameters of the study.  
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If we disregard the dimension added by social media, the broader dilemma posed 
by the student is far from new: all ethnographers must grapple with the socially 
‘contaminated’ nature of fieldwork, and the crosscutting demands and possibilities it 
entails (Lederman, 2007). However, the primary reference point for the student and my 
colleague was the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans—a 
set of national guidelines that inform institutional ethics review processes at universities 
throughout Canada (CIHR, NSERC & SSHRC, 2014). Although this document is 
frequently valorized as overcoming a biomedical model of research ethics (e.g., Tolich 
and Smith, 2014; Nichols, 2015), where discussed, relationality beyond the strict confines 
of the researcher/participant role is treated as a problem to be solved.1 
In this essay, I aim to consider the ‘undesigned relationality’ (Lederman, 2013, 
2016) that characterizes ethnographic fieldwork, along with the ways it is understood—
both in the conceptual frameworks that underpin procedural ethics review and by the 
different disciplines that have come to claim a stake in it. As Rena Lederman (2017) 
observes, if anthropologists and other ethnographers are to better grapple with the 
implications of institutional ethics oversight, we need to devote further attention to how 
our ethical conundrums appear from the vantage point of research ethics administrators 
and our colleagues in neighbouring disciplines. This is clearly a topic of some political 
import: while the clash between ethnographic research and the prevailing bioethical 
framework is largely taken as given by ethnographers who have experienced institutional 
ethics review processes, it has very real effects on the ground (see Wynn, 2011). As Bob 
Simpson (2011: 377), writing specifically about anthropology, observes, ‘The issues at 
stake not only are practical and procedural but also touch on deeper ontological and 
epistemological concerns about the reproduction of the discipline and the practice of 
ethnography as its core methodology’.  
Any discussion of ethics and ethnography is complicated by the fact that the term 
covers an array of disciplinarily-inflected practices and refers to both a process and a 
product. The latter perspective is dominant in anthropology, where ethnography is not so 
much a research method but an intellectual enterprise informed by ‘fieldwork’, which 
includes, but is by no means limited to, ‘participant observation’.2 As Blommaert and Jie 
(2010) observe, this means that the basic architecture of ethnography as anthropologists 
understand it ‘already contains ontologies, methodologies and epistemologies… that do not 
necessarily fit the frameworks of other traditions’ (p. 6, emphasis in original). Where 
ethnography has crossed over into other fields, it is typically decoupled from these 
moorings.3 For example, although sociology has a well-developed tradition of 
ethnographic research, unlike anthropologists, who tend to be concerned with the 
epistemological foundations of ethnography, they are more focused on formulating 
methodological guidelines for its conduct4 (Tavory and Timmermans, 2009).  
	 4 
However, although it is possible to speak of ethnography as a broadly disciplinary 
practice, and I am interested in teasing out these differences, I want to make it clear at the 
outset that such characterizations must inevitably be idealized representations that do not 
map neatly onto the ways that ethnographers perform and understand it. Certainly, there 
are many scholars outside of anthropology who exemplify dimensions of the 
‘ethnographic imperative’, just as there are many anthropologists who do not do 
fieldwork of the kind historically associated with the discipline (Kapferer, 2007). But 
despite the risks of overgeneralization, it is important that we attend to differences in the 
practice of ethnography in order to avoid privileging a particular disciplinary sensibility 
under the official guise of neutrality. Therefore, my goal in what follows is to highlight the 
multiple epistemologies the term disguises, and to emphasize the need for ethical 
pluralism in how we respond to the practices it entails.  
 
Procedural ethics, multiple relationality and ‘dual roles’ 
Regardless of its particular disciplinary configuration, the multiple forms of relationality 
that characterize ethnographic fieldwork are often framed in terms of the tension between 
‘participation’ and ‘observation’, which is standard fodder for ethnographic methods 
textbooks (e.g., Wolcott, 1999; O’Reilly, 2005). This issue has been long discussed by 
ethnographers—from Evans-Pritchard’s (1973: 3) observation that through ethnographic 
fieldwork the anthropologist simultaneously ‘enters into a culture and withdraws from it 
at the same time’ to Byron Good’s emphasis on the ‘duality of the anthropologist’s role as 
critic and participant’ (1994: 27). Indeed, these contradictory qualities of ethnographic 
research are not infrequently glossed under the label of the ‘dual role’ itself. For example, 
in their textbook Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork, Michael Rynkiewich and 
James Spradley refer to the ‘contradictions inherent in the dual roles of detached observer 
and participant-friend’ (1976: 126), and similar characterizations are to be found in the 
work of anthropologists (e.g., Bielo, 2015) and ethnographic sociologists alike (e.g., Prus, 
1996).  
In an unfortunate terminological coincidence (or perhaps not—more below), the 
concept of the ‘dual role’ is also widely used in procedural ethics guidelines to refer to a 
situation where a researcher has a relationship with participants in a pre-existing 
professional capacity. Given the oft-observed biomedical underpinnings of this 
framework, and its attendant ‘ethics of the body’ (B. Simpson, 2011), it should come as 
little surprise that the prototype for the dual role is the clinician-researcher conducting a 
study on his or her patients. This is the context that the concept was initially designed to 
address (e.g., Churchill, 1980), although it has subsequently been extended to other types 
of relationships—those between therapists and clients, between teachers and students, 
and so on.  
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Importantly, the dual role is not seen as intrinsically unethical, but as a 
phenomenon—like other conflicts of interest—that should be carefully managed. This is 
what the Tri Council Policy Statement has to say on the topic:  
Dual roles of researchers and their associated obligations (for example, acting as both a 
researcher and a therapist, caregiver, teacher, advisor, consultant, supervisor, student or 
employer) may create conflicts, undue influences, power imbalances or coercion that 
could affect relationships with others and affect decision-making procedures (e.g., consent 
of participants)… To preserve and not abuse the trust on which many professional 
relationships rest, researchers should be fully cognizant of conflicts of interest that may 
arise from their dual or multiple roles, their rights and responsibilities, and how they can 
manage the conflict (CIHR, NSERC & SSHRC, 2014: 99).  
 
According to the guidelines, if these conflicts can’t be eliminated entirely, they 
should be minimized and managed. For example, the accompanying online tutorial 
advises that in the context of research conducted by teachers, ‘researchers who are 
recruiting for a study should either avoid recruiting students who depend on their good 
will for career advancement, or should have another member of the research team 
conduct the recruitment and the study itself’ (PRE, 2014). 
Lederman (2007, 2016) argues that such ethical stipulations reveal much about 
the kinds of ideal relationships between researchers and participants that the ‘Standard 
Model’ is premised upon. As she observes, especially since the Second World War, 
biomedicine’s epistemological value has relied on the careful delineation of research from 
therapeutic practice, with the two defined in conceptual opposition. In Lederman’s 
words:  
…the Belmont Report locates and buttresses the conceptual wall between two kinds of 
relationships on ethical grounds: therapeutic relationships into which persons enter with a 
conventional expectation that their individual care is the object have different ethical 
entailments from research relationships into which persons enter with a conventional 
expectation that socially beneficial knowledge is the objective (2016: 48).  
 
As Lederman (2016) points out, it is the slippage between individual therapeutic 
care and social benefits that research ethics regulations are largely devoted to addressing. 
Indeed, the potential confusion between research and treatment has been the source of a 
thriving bioethical industry and inspired many of its key concepts—from the notion of 
‘clinical equipoise’ to the ‘therapeutic misconception’. However, this isn’t an inevitable 
way of thinking about the ethics of medical research but is rather the product of certain 
twentieth century developments: namely, the rise of epidemiology and bioethics (see Bell, 
2017). These fields introduced new ways of thinking about the nature of research and 
research relationships.  
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According to Paul Roote Wolpe (1998), medical research in the nineteenth 
century was primarily done by physicians on their own patients. ‘There was no clear 
theoretical or practical differentiation made between standard practice and experimental 
therapy’ (p. 51). Obviously, the notion of a dual role only acquires significance when 
‘treatment’ and ‘research’ become conceptually separated, as happened with the rise of 
clinical epidemiology and its accompanying methods—most notably the randomized 
controlled trial. This led physician-researchers to ‘start looking for subject pools in 
orphanages, the army, insane asylums, and state hospitals’ (Wolpe, 1998: 51) as opposed 
to their own clinics. 
Importantly, under the logic of the randomized controlled trial, an existing 
relationship between the physician and patient was treated as potentially jeopardizing the 
objectivity of the research. This is partly why the gold standard for clinical research is the 
double-blind randomized controlled trial, where neither the researchers nor the patients 
know who has received the treatment and who hasn’t until after the study has been 
completed, thereby minimizing sources of bias and managing the contaminating 
influence of the doctor as a therapeutic agent independent of the treatment itself (see 
Moerman, 2002).  
 
Ethnography, disciplinarity and undesigned relationality 
Although this emphasis on clearly delineated and carefully managed relationships 
between the researcher and researched reaches its apotheosis in medical experiments, it 
underpins many kinds of social research—or what Harold Garfinkel (2002) disparagingly 
called ‘the worldwide social science movement’. As Lederman (2013) observes,  
…mainstream social and behavioral sciences study relations by means of relations; 
however, they do so by constructing specialized research relations with heavily managed, 
conventionalized expectations concerning contact with research participants. They 
construe undesigned relationality in the research as noise distorting reliable, objective 
results (pp. 599-600).  
 
Consider the ways that the concept of ‘rapport’ has conventionally been presented 
in sociological methods textbooks. According to Ann Oakley’s (1981) influential analysis 
of the masculine and objectivist underpinnings of the paradigm, ‘rapport’ is primarily 
conceived as a means of producing more valid and reliable data—‘inoculating’ it against 
bias, as it were. Thus, considerable attention is paid to the perils of being too friendly (or 
‘over-rapport’), with accounts stressing that a balance needs to ‘be struck between the 
warmth required to generate “rapport” and the detachment necessary to see the 
interviewee as an object under surveillance’ (1981: 33). In this way, relationality, when 
cultivated and moderated, is seen to serve the broader values of ‘objectivity, detachment, 
hierarchy and science’ (Oakley, 1981: 38).  
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This view of how social science knowledge is produced is one that has been 
challenged from a variety of quarters, with the most strident critiques coming out of 
socio-cultural anthropology and ethnomethodology5—not coincidentally, fields where 
undesigned relationality is most valued. Writing specifically about anthropological 
ethnography, Johannes Fabian (2007) observes that a distinct change occurred in the 
discipline when anthropologists realized that fieldwork was not simply about collecting 
information. As a product of interaction, ethnography was intrinsically performative; 
thus, what we take away from fieldwork as ‘data’ is made more than found. In Fabian’s 
(2007) words:  
what we learn often does not come as responses to our questions but is enacted in, and 
mediated by, events which we may trigger but cannot really control (every simple 
interview is such a performative event). Similarly, concern with interpretation and 
hermeneutics made us aware of positive naiveté regarding the relations between research 
and writing in the production of ethnographic knowledge (p. 13).  
This recognition of the relationality of knowledge production was widely taken up within 
socio-cultural anthropology, but less broadly influential in sociology, where critiques of 
mainstream sociological knowledge production made fewer strides in transforming the 
discipline as a whole. Although incorporated into qualitative sociology to some degree, 
the rise of qualitative research as a pan-disciplinary ‘method’ has arguably served to 
reinforce rather than challenge the prevailing view of relationality, and the positivism that 
underwrites it (see Bell, 2018, for an illustration).  
This underlying positivism is evident in the overview of fieldwork relations 
presented in the chapter on qualitative research in the Tri Council Policy Statement. 
According to the document: ‘the emergent nature of many qualitative studies makes the 
achievement of rapport with participants and feelings of interpersonal trust crucial to the 
generation of questions considered important or interesting by both parties, and to the 
collection of dependable data’ (CIHR, NSERC & SSHRC, 2014: 142). Here, we see the 
ways in which relationality becomes tied to truth and trustworthiness: once again, rapport 
serves the interests of generating ‘dependable’ data. The instrumental dimensions of 
relationality become even more explicit in the assertion that, ‘In some cases, gathering of 
trustworthy data is best achieved by closeness and extended contact with participants’ (p. 
141). In this framing, relationality is perceived primarily as a means of transforming 
perceptions of the researched about the researcher and the attendant quality of the data 
produced.  
According to some accounts, this is a core feature of ethnography. For example, 
Peter Magolda (2000) discusses the importance of trust and rapport in generating ‘good’ 
ethnographic data and Lisa Weems (2006: 997) highlights the ways in which reciprocal 
relationships have been ‘linked to the potential of ethnographic research to generate 
“more accurate” or “truthful” understanding by closing the distance of interpretation and 
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identification between the researcher and researched’. Echoing this view, Julia O’Connell 
Davidson (2008: 54) writes: ‘It is widely recognized that to achieve an interpretative 
understanding of a given social practice, subculture or culture, the researcher must get 
“close” to her or his research subjects’.  
However, this view of relationality is truer of sociological versions of ethnography 
than anthropological ones,6 although it stems not just from the disciplines’ somewhat 
differing orientations to knowledge production but divergences in approach. Exploring 
the two disciplines’ contrasting stances on the ethical acceptability of deception in 
ethnography, Lederman (2017) observes that the sociological point of view is often 
perceived as in tension with that of the objects of study. Likewise, in Katz and Csordas’ 
(2003) discussion of anthropologists’ and ethnographic sociologists’ approaches to 
phenomenology, they observe that anthropological writings ‘characteristically have 
illuminated native groundings for subjects’ perspectives’, whereas sociological writings are 
more likely to break with members’ perspectives, ‘deconstructing what subjects treat as 
naturally significant’ (pp. 275-276).  
As a result of these differences, Lederman (2017) argues that ethnographic 
sociologists are also more likely to write about the insider/outsider distinction ‘as if their 
sociological, observer, outsider positional identities are the “real”, essential facts’ (2017: 
14), and to represent their fieldwork relations as inauthentic. This is not to say that they 
perceive such relations as insincere or fake, but more that they are viewed along the lines 
of strategically productive ‘roles’ that aid the ethnographer’s primary identity as a 
researcher. Where anthropology differs, according to Lederman, is its embrace of ‘open-
ended intimacy as a scholarly knowledge practice’ (2013: 598). In the classical fieldwork 
situation, anthropologists enter unfamiliar social terrain, learning its mores by developing 
practical competence in the local language and those aspects of daily life enabled by 
relationships cultivated over a lengthy period of time. Their field identities are multiple 
and equally ‘real’: ‘anthropologist’, ‘friend’, ‘student’, ‘apprentice’ and all manner of 
relational attributions offered by their hosts (Lederman, 2017).  
In this context, relationality is not conceived primarily as a means of transforming 
perceptions of the study participants. If anything, the desired transformation is in the 
anthropologist’s perception, as opposed to that of the community she works with (see, for 
example, Evans-Pritchard, 1973). As Bruce Kapferer (2007) observes: ‘It is through the 
reflexive deconstruction of the anthropologist’s own preconceptions in the fieldwork 
encounter that knowledge is gained, not just of the fieldworker’s own taken-for-granted 
realities but also of those with whom the fieldworker engages as a function of the 
encounter itself’ (p. 81). These different views of relationality therefore have consequences 
for how its ethical implications are grasped (B. Simpson, 2011; Lederman, 2016, 2017). 
 
The ethics of relationality as normal vs. exceptional 
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For anthropologists, the moral tensions of fieldwork arguably differ in degree rather than 
in kind from the tensions raised by human interaction in all its forms, with their 
vacillations between ‘sincerity and insincerity, genuineness and hypocrisy, honesty and 
self-deception’ (Geertz, 1968: 155). Viewed in this light, the perils of ethnographic 
fieldwork, as with its promise, stem as much from the anthropologist’s humanity as their 
professional identity as a researcher. As Bob Simpson (2011) observes: 
 Such an approach takes us beyond a rule-based notion of ethics and into a much more 
complex terrain in which the skill of the ethnographer lies in developing and managing 
relations founded on trust, respect, and an avoidance of delimiting the subject. In short, 
the endpoint of this kind of engagement is not the body but the complex and dynamic 
relational worlds which anthropologists enter and in which research subjects live and 
exercise their own ethical and emotional sensibilities, realize deliberative strategies, and 
do so with the benefit of accumulated experience and knowledge (p. 385). 
 
For this reason, ethical dilemmas in anthropological fieldwork are typically 
presented by practitioners as an extension of the dilemmas confronted by being a human 
engaging with other humans. A perfect illustration is to be found in the fieldwork case 
studies discussed in the Handbook on Ethical Issues in Anthropology (Cassell and Jacobs, 1987). 
None of the situations described—such as whether to distribute personal medication, 
witnessing a murder, being asked to provide transport out of town for a murder suspect, 
being offered stolen goods—pertain to situations caused by the anthropologist’s 
professional identity as a researcher. Moreover, in each instance the anthropologists’ 
response would have likely been the same if they had been present in the community in 
an entirely different capacity.  
This sense of fieldwork dilemmas as human dilemmas comes across clearly in the 
work of Murray Wax (1977, 1995), an early and vociferous critic of the extension of 
human subjects regulation to anthropological research. He writes:  
As opportunities present themselves, fieldworkers doubtless are tempted, fall into error, 
and harm their associates or the persons whom they are studying. If fieldworkers did not 
suffer human frailties, they would be likely to be unable to comprehend the ongoing 
human lives of those they wish to study. Moreover, even with the best of intentions, a 
fieldworker may disrupt normal events, because he is a stranger and ignorant of local 
custom. Yet the facts are that living is full of risks and troubles, and in any human 
interaction, those involved may comport themselves more or less strictly and with more or 
less regard for others (Wax, 1977: 325).  
 
This distinct disciplinary orientation to relationality is perhaps clearest in 
anthropologists’ and sociologists’ professional responses to that most intimate of fieldwork 
relationships: sex. Although sexual relationships in the field have historically been 
frowned upon in both disciplines (see Fine, 1993; Kulick and Willson, 1995), there are 
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subtle differences between the ways that anthropologists and sociologists tend to write 
about them—both in the abstract and the particular. For example, in the sociological 
context, Shane Blackman (2007) notes that sexual intimacies challenge the ‘status quo of 
the detachment principle, which understands sex in the field as in contravention of the 
ethnographic code of objectivity’ (p. 707), and that it is perceived to be ‘in opposition to 
the ethical principles of the discipline’ (p. 709). Concomitantly, in instances where sexual 
encounters between sociologists and their informants are suspected, verification is rarely 
forthcoming.  
The seminal case here is that of Laud Humphreys. Although a biography by 
fellow sociologists (Galliher, Brekhus and Keys, 2004) suggests that Humphreys (1970) 
was as much a participant as an observer of the anonymous bathroom encounters he 
documented in Tearoom Trade, this was not something he ever acknowledged, even after 
he came out publicly as gay. Galliher, Brekhus and Keys (2004) ultimately explain this 
not merely by reference to the illegal nature of such activities, but the strength of the 
requirement to present oneself as a neutral observer. In their words: ‘Even though “the 
existence of saucy tales of lurid assignations” abound among ethnographers, researchers 
never admit to such liaisons’ (p. 30). 
Compare such depictions of sex in the field with the treatment of the topic by 
Russell Bernard (2013), the anthropologist who has written most extensively about field 
methods. ‘It is unreasonable to assume’, starts a section titled ‘Sex and Fieldwork’ in one 
such tome, ‘that single, adult fieldworkers are all celibate’ (p. 332). As Jill Dubisch (1995) 
observes, although anthropologists absorb the idea that sexual relationships in the field 
‘would neither be appropriate nor wise’7 (p. 30), such relationships are relatively 
commonplace. Not only are they discussed informally amongst graduate students, they 
manifest in instances of anthropologists marrying people from their fieldsites, and in 
sporadic allusions to such encounters in ethnographies themselves.8 In essence, although a 
kind of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy prevails in the discipline,9 where such relationships 
come to light they are typically chalked up to anthropologists ‘being human’, and seem to 
crystalize the underlying view that anthropologists’ roles—as ‘researcher’, ‘guest’, ‘friend’ 
(and, indeed, ‘lover’)—cannot be readily parsed.10 
 
Implications for conceptualizing ethnographic research ethics 
These differing understandings of relationality (and the epistemologies that underpin 
them) have important consequences for how the broader ethics of ethnographic research 
are conceptualized and responded to. Compare, for example, Murray Wax and the 
ethnographic sociologist Charles Bosk on the difficulty of communicating the nature of 
ethnographic research to one’s interlocutors: 
Given that our hosts and we usually inhabit two different conceptual universes, it has 
been notoriously difficult to communicate who we are and what are our goals… Even 
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when people have the concept of ‘anthropologist,’ it is often misguided, and we are easily 
confused with welfare workers, missionaries, and other folk, and made scapegoats by local 
politicians. Some anthropologists have behaved poorly; others have behaved with 
exquisite courtesy, parity, and consideration (Wax, 1995: 330).  
[E]thnographers trade quite freely on an almost universal misunderstanding between our 
research subjects and ourselves... Because our subjects are flattered by our attention, we 
are allowed to obtain data that it is not necessarily in our subjects’ best interest to reveal. 
Few of us have ever reported that we inform our subjects of this fact. Rather, because it so 
often serves our purposes so well, we encourage any misperceptions that yield rich data 
(Bosk, 2001: 206). 
 
Although both identify the same problem, they characterize its ethical 
implications differently. For Wax, such misunderstandings are an inevitable effect of 
being socially defined by those we engage with. And, like all humans, some 
anthropologists behave exemplarily and others badly when confronted with this 
confusion. In other words, this isn’t some ethnographer’s trick, but an effect of being a 
human engaging with other humans. Bosk, on the other hand, attributes a degree of 
intentional obfuscation to the ethnographer: with less-than-pure motives, she lures her 
interlocutors into a false sense of complacency about her research in order to maximize its 
yields.  
Arguably, if fieldwork relations are conceptualized as a strategically productive 
role one is playing, those aspects of relationality that are otherwise normal take on added 
significance, becoming laden with potentially sinister undertones. Thus, the sociologist 
Judith Stacey (1988: 22-23) argues that: ‘Precisely because ethnographic research depends 
upon human relationship, engagement and attachment, it places research subjects at 
grave risk of manipulation and betrayal by the ethnographer’. In such accounts, the fault 
lies not so much with the individual’s capacity to behave ethically but with the ‘moral 
failings built into the structure of ethnographic research’ (Bosk, 2001: 200). In effect, 
fieldwork becomes a tradeoff between data and ethics, with a perceived ‘conflict of 
interest’ between the ethnographer’s ‘researcher/observer’ and ‘participant’ hats (Stacey, 
1988). Viewed in this light, ethnographic research is not so far from the concept of the 
‘dual role’ promulgated in research ethics guidelines, and appears broadly amenable to its 
prescriptions.  
We see this clearly in the vignette discussed at the beginning of the paper. 
Regarded through the lens of the ‘dual role’, existing friendships within the fieldsite need 
to be separated from the research.11 Recall the trinity of responses specified in the 
Canadian research ethics guidelines for responding to the dual role: eliminate, manage, 
minimize. This is precisely what my colleague tries to do, asking: ‘Should the researcher 
be pretending that she doesn’t see the Facebook account? Should the researcher 
terminate her Facebook friendship during the research?’ In this fashion, the ethical 
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conflict is managed in much the same way as advised for the prototypical doctor-patient 
relationship. 
For those ethnographers who perceive fieldwork as a tradeoff between data and 
ethics, with an attendant conflict of interest between the ethnographer’s ‘researcher/ 
observer’ and ‘participant’ hats, this represents a potentially viable response. Certainly, 
we see various examples of researchers who have responded in much this way to the 
quandaries raised by undesigned relationality. For example, the edited collection Ethical 
Quandaries in Social Research contains a chapter by the sociologist Zethu Matebeni (2014) 
focusing on her experiences as a black lesbian exploring black lesbian identities and 
sexualities in Johannesburg amongst women of her acquaintance. Focusing on the access 
she had to her informants’ lives beyond their formal representations of themselves, she 
writes: ‘While difficult, it was often necessary to separate my two interrelated identities of 
researcher and friend/comrade’ (p. 112). Somewhat to Matebeni’s surprise, the signed 
consent form became a core means of managing these ‘dual’ roles. In her words, ‘When 
people signed a consent form, this marked a boundary, and a particular relationship 
between us. In essence, consent forms were the tools that defined the research 
relationship’ (pp. 112-113).  
This approach only becomes possible, however, when one’s ‘roles’ are 
conceptually separable, which I have argued is antithetical to disciplinary conceptions of 
fieldwork within anthropology. An instructive comparison is the sociologist Julia 
O’Connell Davidson’s (2008) account of the friendship she developed with ‘Desiree’, a sex 
worker and informant in O’Connell’s ethnographic study of prostitution in the UK, and 
the anthropologist Paloma Gay y Blasco’s writings on the friendship she developed with 
Liria de la Cruz Hernández, a Gitana street seller in Blasco’s native Madrid (see Blasco, 
2011, 2017; Blasco and Hernández, 2012). Although both researchers raise similar ethical 
concerns about ethnography, they locate the source of these problems somewhat 
differently. 
For O’Connell Davidson, the core dilemma she confronted in her fieldwork 
related to her friendship with Desiree, which she perceived as both a natural outcome of 
the research and in fundamental tension with it (in other words, the dual role problem). 
O’Connell Davidson initially attempted to deal with this tension by placing boundaries 
around her relationship with Desiree—an approach that Desiree resisted and that 
became increasingly difficult as they became more entrenched in each other’s social 
circles. Ultimately, O’Connell Davidson relied on drawing lines between what counted as 
research ‘data’ in her fieldwork and what didn’t, based on her sense of what information 
Desiree might feel betrayed by if shared. Thus, the crux of the problem, as O’Connell 
Davidson perceives it, relates to the possibility of informed consent and the ways in which 
ethnographic research requires interlocutors to consent to their own objectification and 
appropriation.  
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Blasco, too, is concerned with the role of informants as ‘objects rather than 
creators of anthropological knowledge’ (Blasco and Hernández, 2012: 1). But where 
O’Connell Davidson perceived her friendship with Desiree as in tension with the 
research, this concern is notably lacking in Blasco’s and Hernández’s accounts, despite 
their growing entanglement in each other’s lives—an enmeshment that culminated in 
Blasco helping Hernández to elope with a younger non-Gitano man. Instead, Blasco’s 
(2017) main focus is the ways in which the relationality upon which ethnographic 
fieldwork is based disappears in the act of writing about it; thus, the primary tension she 
identifies is between the ‘conflicting demands of reciprocity and ethnographic writing’ (p. 
95) as opposed to friendship and research per se.  
The contrast between O’Connell Davidson and Blasco’s positions is subtle, but it 
speaks again to underlying disciplinary differences in conceptions of the ethics of 
relationality. Simply put, anthropologists typically cannot parse their identities as 
‘researcher’ and ‘human’ in the field because ethnographic fieldwork is not merely 
perceived as a technique for gathering ‘data’.12 The result of such an attempt can only be 
methodological and conceptual fragmentation, whereby ‘things that ought to be all of a 
piece are split apart’ (B. Simpson, 2011: 382). Instead, as Blasco’s account makes clear, it 
is in the process of writing that the ethical issues raised by relationality are experienced 
most acutely, which is why the vast weight of disciplinary musings have focused on the 
morality of representation as opposed to the ethics of fieldwork per se, which, as 
previously described, are understood as relative and situational (see Castañeda, 2007). 
Indeed, it’s worth noting that even when anthropologists invoke the ‘dual roles’ 
framing, they use it to speak primarily to issues of representation, not to bracket the 
fieldwork experience itself. This is clearly evident in Rynkiewich and Spradley’s (1976) 
discussion of dual roles, where they go on to state that:  
The ethical implications of publication thus stem from the dual roles I played as: (1) 
anthropological researcher with the goal of extending our understanding of human 
behavior and (2) participant in Danish daily life, who, as a human being, developed close 
personal relationships with many of the Danes I met (p. 131, emphasis added).  
Less obviously perhaps, a similar sentiment is evident in the anthropologist Edward 
Simpson’s (2016) reflections on local objections to his research on popular political 
mobilization in India. While raising many of the same concerns as those evident in the 
work of ethnographic sociologists like Bosk (2001) and O’Connell Davidson (2008), he 
articulates them in specific relation to the act of writing itself. In Simpson’s (2016) words, 
‘My own experiences of sharing academic writing have also impressed on me that 
anthropology is a rather violent and abrupt process, which takes place slowly in a gradual 
and usually friendly fashion: pious fraudulence, professionalized duplicity, or ritualistic 
sanctimony?’ (p. 115, emphasis added). Thus, his arguments relate not to the need to 
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rehabilitate ethnographic fieldwork itself, but call for an ethics of engagement that 
considers ‘the consequence of going public and engaging with objections’ (p. 123).  
The kind of ethical engagement being advocated, embracing as it does an ethic of 
relationality that draws together process and product, is inimical to institutional ethics 
review processes, which are almost exclusively concerned with the ‘doing to’ that happens 
during ‘data collection’ itself13 (see Bell, 2014). The unfortunate consequence is not only 
that such processes fail to address the real ethical issues that ethnographers confront, but 
that ethnographic fieldwork—especially of the kind based on the epistemological premise 
(and promise) of undesigned relationality— is made to appear ‘downright deviant on 




From an epistemological and ethical standpoint, ethnographic fieldwork is distinctive 
insofar as it relies on undesigned relationality. Where other approaches ‘aim to construct 
a purified relation between knower and known, carefully bracketing other potential 
identities and expectations by controlling the contexts and media of their engagement’ 
(Lederman, 2007: 319), ethnographers embrace it as a way into grasping social worlds. 
Unfortunately, it is precisely this feature that is the source of ethnographers’ difficulties 
with institutional ethics review—and the requirements around informed consent, risk-
benefit analysis, etc.—that comprise the heart of the review process. 
The ‘dual relationship’ seems to be the only paradigm available within the 
Standard Model to conceptualize research contexts where the researcher does not have a 
fixed identity as a researcher. However, this is then transformed into a ‘problem’ to be 
managed or solved. In many respects, this response speaks volumes about the underlying 
conception of relationality that dominates biomedical and mainstream social and 
behavioral research. The ideal being strived for is that of a pristine ‘researcher’/’subject’ 
relationship free of other social entailments, or where such entailments are put in direct 
service of the research itself (e.g., establishing ‘rapport’ to improve the quality of the data 
furnished).   
Obviously, the fact of a mismatch between the assumptions of the Standard 
Model and the particularities of ethnographic fieldwork is a far from novel insight (B. 
Simpson, 2011). However, less recognized is the fact that attempts to accommodate 
qualitative research don’t necessarily resolve the underlying problem. I’m on the record 
as having serious doubts about whether such ‘accommodations’ can be anything more 
than superficial lip service in the face of a commitment to a universal code of ethics. 
However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that even named approaches 
such as ‘ethnography’ cannot be assessed in isolation from their disciplinary moorings. As 
	 15 
I have argued elsewhere, ‘There is a real danger that certain styles of ethnography (or 
phenomenology, etc.), especially those more amenable to established procedural 
guidelines, will become the standard against which other forms of ethnographic fieldwork 
are measured’ (Bell, 2016). 
As I have hopefully demonstrated, certain versions of ethnography lend 
themselves better to procedural ethics review processes because they are based on a 
conception of relationality that affirms the essential rightness of the Standard Model of 
the researcher-participant relationship. For some ethnographers, especially those trained 
outside of anthropology, intimacy as a scholarly knowledge practice appears intellectually 
sloppy and ethically suspect from the perspective of their own disciplines (Lederman, 
2017), with important implications for how they conceive and respond to the dilemmas it 
raises. In particular, it often leads to efforts to make ethnographic research more 
commensurate with the mainstream model: namely, by creating boundaries around the 
‘research’ role and predefining what constitutes ‘data’ and what does not. However, this 
approach becomes inconceivable when open-ended intimacy itself is the premise, and 
where process and product are enmeshed in both name and deed. Thus, if ethnography 
has been ‘indigenized’ to a certain extent in the different disciplinary contexts in which it 
has been taken up, then it behooves us to acknowledge the plurality of values and 
meanings it entails—and the challenge this poses to the possibility of a pan-disciplinary 
consensus on ethnographic research ethics. Otherwise we run the very real risk of 
legislating it out of existence (see E. Simpson, 2011).  
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Notes 
1 I should note that the chapter on qualitative research does acknowledge that: ‘In certain cases, contacts 
between researchers and participants can extend over a lifetime, and these individuals may engage in a 
variety of relationships over and above their specific “research” relationship’ (CIHR, NSERC & SSHRC, 
2014: 142). However, the underlying assumption seems to be that they are separable from the research 
relationship (as evidenced by the ‘over and above’ wording) and thereby ethically uncomplicated. 
2 Johannes Fabian (2007: 13) argues that participant observation is often—albeit mistakenly—characterized 




3 Muddying the waters further is the fact that it is increasingly common for the term ‘ethnography’ to be 
used as a synonym for ‘qualitative research’ more broadly (see, for example, Brink and Edgecombe, 2003; 
Mannay and Morgan, 2014).  
4 It’s no coincidence that the majority of how-to guides on ethnographic methods have been written by 
sociologists. 
5 The list is long and any attempt to enumerate key figures will be rife with omissions, but for some 
particularly influential anthropological critiques of ethnographic knowledge production see Fabian (1983), 
Briggs (1986) and Clifford and Marcus (1986). For parallel ethnomethodological critiques of mainstream 
sociological knowledge production see Cicourel (1964, 1973) and Garfinkel (1967), although Cicourel’s 
work predates the term. 
6 Both Magolda and Weems are sociologists of education. 
7 This view is perhaps most famously reflected in the advice Evans-Pritchard (1973: 1) received from 
Charles Seligman to ‘take ten grains of quinine every night and to keep off women’.  
8 I doubt it’s a coincidence that all the examples Fine (1993) provides to debunk the ‘lie’ of the ‘chaste 
ethnographer’ are of anthropological accounts of sexual relationships in the field, which seems to reflect the 
discipline’s more tolerant attitude towards such encounters. Certainly, none of the anthropologists he 
discusses (Paul Rabinow, Colin Turnbull, Dona Davis) were condemned by fellow anthropologists on the 
basis of their intimations and revelations.	
9 This was unquestionably the case when Kulick and Willson’s edited collection on erotic subjectivity in 
anthropological fieldwork was published in 1995; arguably, little has changed in the intervening decades. 
10 See Carrier (2006) for an anthropologist’s take on the impossibility of separating one’s identities as an 
ethnographer and lover when studying the topic of sexuality. 
11 It’s also worth noting that this framework immediately raises the prospect of ‘inducement’, or, at the very 
least, a sense of obligation to participate in the research. This is something the student is obviously aware of, 
given her statement that: ‘I never asked them directly to participate; they contacted me after receiving the 
recruitment materials I’d sent them to kindly send along to potentially interested others’.  
12 The push towards data archiving (mandated by a growing number of funding agencies), along with the 
new data protection legislation in the UK and Europe therefore have significant—and rather worrisome—
implications for the practice of ethnographic fieldwork, based as they are on a positivist view of what 
constitutes ‘data’. Although I have not addressed it here, ethics committees are only one of the regimes 
contributing to the erasure of epistemological and ethical pluralism that we are currently witnessing. 
13 This, of course, is the result of the prevailing ‘ethics-of-the-body-which-happens-to-have-a-person-
attached’ underwriting procedural ethics frameworks (see B. Simpson, 2011 for further discussion). 
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